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7 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with Andrew Marshall,
Director, Net Assessments, DoD, 7 March 1986

1. [] arranged the meeting which he and I attended in Marshall's Pentagon office. I described the genesis of the force multiplier study and Mr. Casey's interest in it in a resource/budgetary sense. I said that I valued his perspectives about the concept and how it might be approached and asked him for the names of others that I might profitably contact.*

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2. Marshall said that the DCI's interest was "not unreasonable." He said he was not sure if the study's focus should be on supporting military operations versus a broader inquiry of intelligence as the basis for a better strategy for competing more effectively with the Soviet Union in the military area. (In any case, a more systematic effort on the latter was needed within the DoD). In terms of military operations, under conditions of increasingly limited resources we had to be more careful in picking military areas in emphasizing competition with the Soviets--we need to focus on "high-leverage" areas important to us. For example, advantages in ASW carry a variety of virtues for us. But we still need to have better intelligence on certain aspects of Soviet naval operations and naval R&D.

3. Marshall said that more needs to be done in developing analysis and extrapolations about how the Soviet General Staff sees the military situation in the various theaters of operations (the calculus of the "correlation of forces" concept). In particular, we need to know the results of their "systematic scoring system," i.e., their own efforts as net assessment. If we had this knowledge, it would enable us to be more selective about where to put resources, and would help us make appropriate improvements to our own forces. The essential point: a more complete understanding of their calculations would clarify which sorts of our weapons programs and deployments would

*Marshall mentioned a number of people at the War Colleges, on the NSC staff, and elsewhere that might be helpful in developing his and other ideas (he also said he would send to me a more complete list of contacts that might be fruitful): Rod St. Martin, NSC; Colonel Al Gropeman, USAF; General Harvey Hughes, USAF; Bill Odom; Admiral Metcalf; Colonel Bud Hayes, USMC; LTC John Hoffman, AWC; and Colonel Ken Alnwick, NDU.

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"change the results of their scoring system" en route to more effective deterrence. This would be a good intelligence angle for exploring ways for being more effective in the military competition with the Soviets.

4. In terms of an R & D strategy--the general area of which technologies to pursue more rapidly--Marshall foresaw concrete recommendations that might be made. Beyond this, command and control in the context of war gaming and simulations would be instructive of the kinds of intelligence that would make the difference in outcomes.



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